BONJOUR'S ARGUMENTS AGAINST SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE A PRIORI ABSTRACT. I reconstruct and critique two arguments Laurence BonJour has recently offered against skepticism about the a priori. While the arguments may provide anti-skeptical, internalist foundationalists with reason to accept the a priori, I show that neither argument provides sufficient reason for believing the more general conclusion that there is no rational alternative to accepting the a priori.
Laurence BonJour (1998) has recently developed and defended a moderate rationalist account of a priori justification. 1 An essential component of BonJour's defense is a pair of arguments that purport to demonstrate the necessity of believing in the a priori. In what follows I reconstruct each of the arguments and make explicit the key assumptions that lie behind them. I then critically examine the arguments and show that neither of them succeeds in adequately supporting its conclusion. I conclude the essay by considering a dilemma BonJour has formulated for any attempt to argue either in favor of or against the possibility of a priori justification. I. BonJour's (1998, p. 4) first argument against skepticism about the a priori appears in the following passage:
For present purposes, I shall suppose that there are certain ''foundational'' beliefs that are fully justified by appeal to direct experience or sensory observation alone... The obvious and fundamental epistemological question then becomes whether it is possible to infer, in a way that brings with it epistemic justification, from these foundational beliefs to beliefs whose content goes beyond direct experience or observation: beliefs about the past, the future, and the unobserved aspects of the present; beliefs Philosophical Studies (2008) 137:243À267 Ó Springer 2006 DOI 10.1007/s11098-005-5386-3 that are general in their content; or beliefs that have to do with kinds of things that are not directly observable.
If the answer to this question is ''no,'' then the upshot is a quite deep form of skepticism (exactly how deep will depend on one's account of the foundational beliefs-perhaps even solipsism of the present moment). But if the answer is ''yes,'' then such inferences must seemingly rely on either premises or principles of inference that are at least partially justified a priori. For if the conclusions of the inferences genuinely go beyond the content of direct experience, then it is impossible that those inferences could be entirely justified by appeal to that same experience. In this way, a priori justification may be seen to be essential if extremely severe forms of skepticism are to be avoided.
BonJour's argument, a constructive dilemma, can be reconstructed as follows:
(1.1) Assume: There are certain ''foundational'' beliefs that are fully justified by appeal to direct experience or sensory observation alone.
It is either possible or impossible to infer, in a way that brings with it epistemic justification, from these foundational beliefs to beliefs whose content goes beyond direct experience or observation. If an inference cannot be justified entirely by appeal to the content of direct experience, the justification for the inference must be at least partially a priori. (1.6) Therefore, either inferences from foundational beliefs to beliefs whose content goes beyond direct experience are justifiable at least partially a priori or a deep form of skepticism results.
The crucial premises in this argument are (1.4) and (1.5). The version of (1.4) that appears in the passage above is weaker than necessary and almost certainly does not reflect JAMES BEEBE
